

SQLsign2DPush

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
SQLparty 2025/4/28

Overview

- We propose a new SQIsign variant, **SQIsign2DPush**.
- Construct a **new algorithm** for the **auxiliary isogeny**.
- Also use DoublePath in SQIsignHD.
- We can reduce the number of $(2, 2)$ -isogenies in signing.

This talk manly focuses on how to compute the **auxiliary isogeny**.


Motivation



In the NIST SQIsign,

- **Blue isogenies** by IdealTolsogeny in SQIsign2D-West.
- **Purple isogenies** by Vélu's formula.

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


In the NIST SQIsign,

- **Blue isogenies** by IdealTorsogeny in SQIsign2D-West.
- **Purple isogenies** by Vélú's formula.

Many $(2, 2)$ -isogenies in signing \Rightarrow We want to reduce.

Diagram of SQIsign2DPush



- **Blue isogenies** by DoublePath in SQIsignHD.
- **Purple isogenies** by Vélu's formula.
- **Red isogeny** by **Our new algorithm**.

Notation


- $p = c \cdot 2^{e_2} \cdot 3^{e_3} - 1$ is a prime number ($2^{e_2} > \sqrt{p}$).
- $E, E^\bullet, E_\bullet, \dots$: supersingular elliptic curves over \mathbb{F}_{p^2}
- $E_0 : y^2 = x^3 + x/\mathbb{F}_p, j(E_0) = 1728$.
- Identify $\text{End}(E_0)$ with $\mathcal{O}_0 = \mathbb{Z} + \mathbb{Z}\mathbf{i} + \mathbb{Z}\frac{\mathbf{i}+\mathbf{j}}{2} + \mathbb{Z}\frac{1+\mathbf{k}}{2}$.

DoublePath [DLRW 2024]

Input: E_0

Output:

- two random 2^{e_2} -isogenies $E_0 \xrightarrow{\varphi_2} E_2 \xrightarrow{\psi_2} E$,
- the left \mathcal{O}_0 -ideal I_2 corresponding to $\psi_2 \circ \varphi_2$,
- two random 3^{e_3} -isogenies $E_0 \xrightarrow{\varphi_3} E_3 \xrightarrow{\psi_3} E$,
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Note : $p = c \cdot 2^{e_2} \cdot 3^{e_3} - 1$.

Kani's lemma

Setting

$$E_1 \xrightarrow{\varphi_1} E_2 \xrightarrow{\varphi_2} E_3$$

$$d_1 := \deg \varphi_1 \text{ and } d_2 := \deg \varphi_2$$
$$\gcd(d_1, d_2) = 1 \text{ and } d_1 + d_2 = 2^e$$

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\exists algorithm s.t.

Input : $E_1, E_3, d_1, d_2, (\varphi_2 \circ \varphi_1) \upharpoonright_{E_1[2^e]}$

Output : $E_2, \varphi_1, \widehat{\varphi_2}$.

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Output : $E_2, \varphi_1, \widehat{\varphi_2}$.

Note:

- Using a $(2^e, 2^e)$ -isogeny
- d_1 and d_2 are not necessarily smooth.

Auxiliary isogeny

$$\begin{array}{ccccc}
 E_{\text{com}} & \xrightarrow{q} & E'_{\text{chl}} & \xrightarrow{2^\bullet} & E_{\text{chl}} \\
 \downarrow \varphi_{\text{aux}} \quad 2^e - q & & \searrow \varphi_{\text{rsp}} & & \\
 & & & & \\
 E_{\text{aux}} & & & &
 \end{array}$$

Let q be the odd part of $\deg \varphi_{\text{rsp}}$.

- $q < 2^{e_2}$.
- $3 \nmid q$ (so that $\widehat{\varphi_{\text{rsp}}} \circ \varphi_{\text{chl}}$ is cyclic).

We want to compute φ_{aux} of degree $2^e - q$ for some $e \leq e_2$.

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$$E_{\text{aux}} \xleftarrow{\varphi_{\text{aux}}^{(3)}} E'_{\text{aux}} \xleftarrow{\varphi'_{\text{aux}}} E_{\text{com}}$$

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- Let $d := \deg \varphi'_{\text{aux}}$. ($2^e - q = d \cdot 3^\bullet$)
- There is $e' \leq e$ s.t. $2^{e'} > d$ and $3 \nmid 2^{e'} - d$.
(If $\varphi_{\text{aux}}^{(3)} = \text{id}$ then $e' = e$. Otherwise, e or $e - 1$ is OK.)

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
For simplicity, we assume $e' = e$, i.e., $3 \nmid 2^e - d$.


How to compute φ'_{aux}

Input: $\varphi_{\text{com}}^{(1)}$, $\varphi_{\text{com}}^{(2)}$, d , e s.t.


- $\deg \varphi_{\text{com}}^{(1)} = \deg \varphi_{\text{com}}^{(2)} = 3^{e_3}$
- $e \leq e_2$ and $2^e > d$.
- $3 \nmid d$ and $3 \nmid 2^e - d$.

Output: $\varphi'_{\text{aux}} \upharpoonright_{E_{\text{com}}[2^{e_2}]}$ of degree d from E_{com} .







- ① Compute $\alpha \in \text{End}(E_0)$ s.t. $\deg \alpha = 3^{e_3} \cdot d(2^e - d)$.




- ① Compute $\alpha \in \text{End}(E_0)$ s.t. $\deg \alpha = 3^{e_3} \cdot d(2^e - d)$.
- ② Divide α into $\widehat{\varphi_0} \circ \psi_0 \circ \rho_0$ s.t.
 $\deg \rho_0 = 3^{e_3}$, $\deg \psi_0 = 2^e - d$, and $\deg \varphi_0 = d$.




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- 3 Compute ρ_0 by Vélu's formula.




4 Compute $(\widehat{\psi_0} \circ \varphi_0) \upharpoonright_{E_0[2^e]}$ by α and ρ_0 .




- 4 Compute $(\widehat{\psi_0} \circ \varphi_0) \upharpoonright_{E_0[2^e]}$ by α and ρ_0 .
- 5 Compute ψ_0 and φ_0 by Kani's lemma.




6 Compute $\widehat{\psi_0} \circ \varphi_0(\ker \varphi_{\text{com}}^{(1)})$ by ψ_0 and φ_0 .




- 6 Compute $\widehat{\psi_0} \circ \varphi_0(\ker \varphi_{\text{com}}^{(1)})$ by ψ_0 and φ_0 .
- 7 Compute $\varphi_1 := (\widehat{\psi_0} \circ \varphi_0) * \varphi_{\text{com}}^{(1)}$ by Vélu's formula.




8 Compute $\widehat{\varphi_1 * \psi_0} \circ (\varphi_{\text{com}}^{(1)} * \varphi_0) \upharpoonright_{E_m[2^e]}$.




- 8 Compute $\widehat{\varphi_{1*} \psi_0} \circ (\varphi_{\text{com}*}^{(1)} \varphi_0) \upharpoonright_{E_m[2^e]}$.
- 9 Compute $\varphi_{1*} \psi_0$ and $\varphi_{\text{com}*}^{(1)} \varphi_0$ by Kani's lemma.




- 8 Compute $\widehat{\varphi_{1*}\psi_0} \circ (\varphi_{\text{com}*}^{(1)}\varphi_0) \upharpoonright_{E_m[2^e]}$.
- 9 Compute $\varphi_{1*}\psi_0$ and $\varphi_{\text{com}*}^{(1)}\varphi_0$ by Kani's lemma.
(Let $\psi_m := \varphi_{1*}\psi_0$ and $\varphi_m := \varphi_{\text{com}*}^{(1)}\varphi_0$.)




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- 10 Let $\varphi'_{\text{aux}} := \varphi_{\text{com}}^{(2)} * \varphi_m$.
- 11 Compute $\varphi'_{\text{aux}} \upharpoonright_{E_{\text{com}}[2^{e_2}]}$ by $\varphi_{\text{com}}^{(2)}$, φ_m , $\varphi_m * \varphi_{\text{com}}^{(2)}$.

Advantage of SQIsign2DPush

Fewer $(2, 2)$ -isogenies in signing.

Table: Approximate numbers of isogenies in signing (λ bits security)

	2	3	$(2, 2)$
Push	2λ	7λ	2λ
West	1λ	0	9λ
East	1λ	0	6λ

We expect that SQIsign2DPush is **faster** than other SQIsign variants.

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Note: The verification of SQIsign2DPush is slightly less efficient.

\therefore The cyclicity check of $\widehat{\varphi_{\text{rsp}}} \circ \varphi_{\text{chl}}$ requires a point evaluation by $(2, 2)$ -isogenies.

Security

We need **ad hoc** security assumption:

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Trying to prove the security in a similar way to the NIST SQIsign.

Still ongoing...

Parameters & Sizes

Security (bits)	p	Public key (bytes)	Sign (bytes)
128	$2^{131} \cdot 3^{78} - 1$	66	152
192	$2^{191} \cdot 3^{117} - 1$	98	220
256	$2^{263} \cdot 3^{156} - 1$	130	297

The sizes are almost the same as the NIST SQIsign.

Summary

- We proposed a new SQIsign variant, SQIsign2DPush.
- We reduced the number of $(2, 2)$ -isogenies in signing 😊
- The verification is slightly less efficient 😊
- The security assumption is ad hoc 😞